纵向研发合作中的投资决策与甄别合同设计

The Research of Investment Decisions and Screening Contract Design in a Vertical R&D Partnership

纵向研发合作中,研发产品的收益类型为开发单位的私有信息。本文考虑纵向研发合作中研究单位的单边合作性投资激励问题,建立了信息不对称时的投资决策模型,为研究单位设计了一个根据收益类型的先验概率制定相应的投资策略的信息甄别合同。研究结果表明:信息不对称导致研究单位的投资积极性降低,且投资水平随着风险率递减;当研发产品的收益类型增加或者开发单位的保留收益水平降低时,信息不对称导致的研发合作效率降低程度减少。为了缓解信息不对称导致的投资不足问题,结合信息披露和期权理论设计了一个退出权合同。

In a vertical R&D partnership,the development unit has private information about the valuation type of innovative products.This paper establishes a model to explore investment incentive in a vertical R&D partnership when research unit innovator makes a unilateral cooperative investment,then designs a screening contract for research unit to randomize his investment strategy based on his belief about valuation type.The results show there is an underinvestment problem under incomplete-information game,and the investment level specifi ed in the screening contract is negatively related to the hazard rate.Furthermore,information asymmetric has a negative effect on cooperative effi ciency,which will be lower as the increase of valuation type and the decrease of principle’s reservation utilities.In order to realize the effi cient investment,we design an exit option contract based on information disclosure and option.