农村征地冲突的RDEU鹰鸽博弈均衡分析

The equilibrium analysis of RDEU Hawk-dove game model on conflict over rural land expropriation

将等级依赖期望效用理论模型与非对称鹰鸽博弈模型相结合,构建农村征地冲突的RDEU鹰鸽博弈模型,同时探讨心理情绪因素和非对称因素对博弈参与者行为策略的影响。研究表明,地方政府或农民的行为不仅受对方策略选择影响,还受情绪和非对称程度的影响。地方政府或农民越乐观,越倾向于和平解决冲突问题,地方政府或农民越悲观,越倾向于采取极端性对抗行为,且悲观情绪更容易影响地方政府或农民的行为抉择;而非对称程度越大,地方政府越倾向于采取强硬策略,农民越倾向于采取妥协策略。MATLAB的数值模拟情况进一步验证了这一结论,且为寻求可行性的冲突治理策略提供了参考方向。

By combining rank dependent expected utility theory model with asymmetric hawk-dove game model,thepresent essay constructs land expropriation compensation RDEU hawk-dove game model in order to explore theinfluence of the emotional factors and asymmetric factors on the behavior strategy of game participants The resultsshow that the behavior of local governments or farmers is not only affected by the choice of the other strategies,but alsoinfluenced by the degree of emotion and asymmetry.The more optimistic,the more inclined to solve the conflictproblem,the more pessimistic,the more inclined to take extreme resistance behavior,and pessimism is more likely toaffect local governments’or farmers’behavior choices.The greater the degree of asymmetry,the more localgovernments tend to take tough strategies,and farmers tend to adopt a compromise strategy.The numerical simulationof MATLAB further validates this conclusion,and it provides a reference for the conflict management strategy.