董事网络、独立董事治理与上市公司过度投资行为研究

Research on Board Network,Governance Role of Independent Directors and Over Investment Behavior of Listed Companies

自2001年证监会针对上市公司提出关于独立董事数量的要求后,独立董事兼任现象逐步出现,上市公司间形成了越发紧密的网络形态。使用2003—2015年中国上市公司独立董事任职数据,构建了以上市公司为网络节点,以独立董事兼任为网络联结的董事网络,研究了上市公司在董事网络中的中心性、结构洞性、聚集性对其过度投资水平的影响以及外部信息资源质量对上述影响的调节效应。研究发现:中心性、结构洞性的提高对上市公司过度投资水平存在正向影响,聚集性的提高对上市公司过度投资水平存在负向影响,且上述影响均在外部信息资源质量较低时更为明显;除此之外,中心性、结构洞性、聚集性对过度投资水平的影响不存在显著的交互效应。基于上市公司在董事网络中结构优化的视角提出相应政策建议。

Since the independent directors'quantity of listed companies in China has been required by CSRC in2001,with the interlocking of independent directors,companies formed a closing network.We used the data of independent directors of China's listed companies from2003to2015,constructed the board network with the nodes of companies and ties of interlocking,then explored how centrality,structural holes and clustering coefficient affect the over investment level and how the external information resources quality moderate such influence mentioned above.We found that centrality and structural holes have a positive effect,while clustering coefficient has a negative effect and it will be more obvious when the quality of external information resources are lower.And the interactions of centrality,structural holes and clustering coefficient are not significant.Finally,we put policy suggestions based on the perspective of optimization of board network structure.