期刊文献+

企业碳交易动态博弈及均衡分析

Dynamic Game and Equilibrium Analysis of Carbon Trading
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摘要 建立了碳排放动态交易市场环境下企业最优控制模型,定义企业碳排放权购买倾向指数并计算其Nash均衡产量;基于企业有限理性假设及相应的产量调节机制,建立企业碳排放交易的动态博弈模型,计算动态系统的均衡点和局部稳定域,并进行数值仿真.根据模型分析结果,提出政府提高碳交易市场活跃度与效率、企业实施碳交易决策实现利润最大化和保持市场稳定的相关建议. An optimal control model under the dynamic carbon trading market environment was established.Meanwhile,enterprise’s carbon emissions of purchasing propensity index was defined,and the Nash equilibrium output was calculated.Based on the assumption of enterprise’s limited rationality and the corresponding output adjustment mechanism,the dynamic game model of carbon trading of enterprises was established.The equilibrium points and local stability regions of the dynamic system were calculated,and the numerical simulation was carried out.According to the results of the model analysis,some suggestions were put forward on how to improve the activity and efficiency of carbon trading market for government,and how to realize the maximization of profit and maintain the market stability for enterprises.
作者 宋杰鲲 牛丹平 梁璐璐 曹子建 张凯新 SONG Jiekun;NIU Danping;LIANG Lulu;CAO Zijian;ZHANG Kaixin(School of Economics and Management,China University of Petroleum,Qingdao 266580,Shandong China)
出处 《河南科学》 2018年第2期270-277,共8页 Henan Science
基金 教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目(16YJAZH054) 山东省自然科学基金项目(ZR2015GM008)
关键词 碳交易 动态博弈 均衡分析 最优控制 有限理性 carbon trading dynamic game equilibrium analysis optimal control limited rationality
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