论奥特苏卡对帕菲特“优先论”的三个质疑

Sketching Otsuka's Three Questiones of Parfit's “the Priority View”

帕菲特主张把一定的利益优先给予那些处境较差者更加重要,并且利益接受者的状态越差,给予他的利益的道德价值就越大。在奥特苏卡看来,帕菲特的优先论至少在三个方面是值得质疑的:其一是优先论对个人的理性偏好不敏感;其二是优先论对"谨慎的证明"不敏感;其三是优先论对不同个体的竞争性要求不敏感。奥特苏卡对优先论的三个质疑展示了平等主义者反对优先论的一种新的路径和视角,表明优先论虽然对平等主义提出了有力的挑战,但由于其自身存在一些缺陷,因而,它尚不足以取代平等主义而成为分配正义的唯一原则。

Parfit's the priority view advocates giving certain interest to those poor situation,and the worse the recipient's state is,the greater his moral value will be.Otsuka opposes questions of the priority view from three aspects:First,the priority view is not sensitive to individual rationality preference;Second,the priority view is not sensitive to the cautious proof;Third,the priority view is not sensitive to the different requirements of the individual.By explaining the three questions,this paper shows a path and perspective which egalitarian against the priority view.In spite of the challenges to egalitarianism by the priority view,due to some shortcomings of its own,it is not strong enough to replace egalitarianism as the only principle of distribution justice.