零售商主导的竞争供应链物流外包决策与协调

Logistics outsourcing decisions and coordination of the competing supply chain under a dominate retailer

在零售商主导、上游制造商存在竞争情况下,考虑产品的替代性,应用博弈论理论,从第三方物流(3PL)服务商的低成本效应和双重边际效应角度,分析物流外包对零售商和制造商利润的影响,并给出供应链物流外包决策的建议。此外,进一步分析供应链物流外包时,制造商联合决策对供应链成员的影响,并针对供应链联合决策,采用两部收费契约协调供应链成员的利益,实现供应链成员利润的帕累托改进。研究结果表明:3PL服务商的低成本效应与双重边际效应的双重作用结果,决定了供应链物流外包是否有利;产品替代性越高,3PL服务商带来的低成本效应影响越小;制造商联合决策时供应链效率最低,供应链集中决策时效率最高。

In the manufacturers competing supply chain dominated by a retailer,game theory was applied to analyze the influence of logistics outsourcing on retailer and manufactures by considering the products substitution,the third-party logistics low cost effect and double marginal effect.Advice of logistics outsourcing decisions was given in different scenarios.The influence of manufactures joint decisions on supply chain members was further analyzed.In the centralized decision-making supply chain,a two-part tariffs contract was designed to coordinate the supply chain and achieve the Pareto improvement.Results show that the balance between the low cost effect and the double marginal effect decides weather or not outsourcing is benefit for supply chain;the low cost effect is smaller with the product substitution increasing;when the manufactures jointly make decisions,the supply chain efficiency is lowest;when the supply is centralized to make decisions,the supply chain efficiency is highest.