“反公地悲剧”视角下的宪法监督制度研究

Study of Constitutional Supervision System from the Perspective of“Tragedy of Anti-commons”

"反公地悲剧"是产权经济学的一个概念,用来说明在公地内存在着很多权利所有者,为了达到某种目的,每个当事人都有权阻止其他人使用该资源或相互设置使用障碍,而没有人拥有所有的使用权,导致资源的闲置和使用不足,最终造成浪费。从"反公地悲剧"理论得到启发,文章认为,在我国当前的宪法监督制度中,也存在着类似产权经济学上的"反公地悲剧"的现象,两者有三个方面的相似之处,因此文章将之称为宪法监督制度中的"反公地悲剧"。避免产权经济学中"反公地悲剧"的手段有整合产权、加强制度建设等,而针对当下我国的宪法监督制度的完善问题,也需要重新整合资源,但必须在人民代表大会制度下进行。

“Tragedy of anti-commons”is a concept of property economics to illustrate that in view of many rights owners of the commons,in order to achieve a certain purpose,each party has the right to prevent others from using the resources or set the use barriers,and no one has all the right to use and lead to idleness and waste of the resources.Based on the theory of“tragedy of anti-commons”,it is pointed out that in the current constitutional supervision system in China,there exists similar phenomenon of“tragedy of anti-commons”in property economics,and the two have similarities in three aspects,which can be called the“tragedy of anti-commons”in the constitutional supervision system.The way to avoid the“tragedy of anti-commons”in property economics is to integrate property rights and strengthen system construction.For the perfection of the current constitutional supervision system in China,the resources also need to be reintegrated,but it must be carried out under the people's congress system.