企业知识共享伙伴选择的信号传递模型研究

Research on Signal Transfer Model of Enterprise Knowledge Sharing Partner Selection

[目的/意义]随着生产性服务业的蓬勃发展,企业间知识共享服务日益成为协同创新的常态,而面对众多良莠不齐的知识服务机构,如何克服共享伙伴选择过程中信息不对称问题,选择适合企业需求的共享伙伴,成为企业间知识共享的关键议题。[方法/过程]将知识共享分为显性知识共享市场和隐形知识共享市场,通过信号传递博弈的知识共享伙伴选择模型,研究了在不同类型知识共享过程中,企业知识共享的动机和行为策略,以及由此造成的显性知识共享市场和隐性知识共享市场的分离均衡。[结果/结论]研究发现,在显性知识共享市场中,知识共享主体信号传递和甄别成本都不高,企业更多选择低价策略,虽然这并不会导致知识共享市场的萎缩,但使低质量知识供给方成为显性知识共享市场的卖方主体。在隐性知识共享市场,知识共享的复杂性和风险均变大,高质量知识供给方信号传递优势明显,当追加的信号成本小于高质量知识供给主体而大于低质量供给主体的共享溢价时,两类知识供给主体实现了分离,解决了隐形知识共享市场的信息不对称问题。

[Purpose/Significance]With the development of productive service industry,the knowledge sharing service among enterprises is becoming the norm of collaborative innovation.How can enterprises overcome the problem of information asymmetry in the process of sharing partner selection and ultimately choose the suitable one among the many knowledge service organizations of different qualities has become a key issue.[Method/Process]In this paper,the knowledge sharing is divided into explicit knowledge sharing market and tacit knowledge sharing market.Through the knowledge sharing partner selection model of signal transmission game,the paper studies the motivation and behavior strategy of enterprise knowledge sharing in different types of knowledge sharing,and the separation equilibrium of the explicit knowledge sharing market and the tacit knowledge sharing market.[Result/Conclusion]The study shows that,in the explicit knowledge sharing market,the signal transmission and screening costs of the enterprises are not high,and the enterprises tend to choose low-cost strategies,although this does not lead to the shrink of the knowledge sharing market,the low-quality knowledge provider becomes the main body of the sellers of this market.In the tacit knowledge sharing market,the complexity of knowledge sharing increases,the risks become higher,and the signal delivery of high-quality knowledge provider has obvious advantages.When the additional signal cost is lower than the high-quality knowledge supply subject and higher than the shared premium of the low-quality supply subject,the two types of knowledge supply subjects realize the separation,thus solves the problem of market information asymmetry in the tacit knowledge sharing market