元模态可设想性论证的困难

The Problem with Meta-Modal Conceivability Arguments

元模态可设想性论证是利用CP论题讨论形如□S的命题是否可能为真的一类论证。然而,我们可以将任何一个元模态论证"反转"从而构造它的平行论证,得到与原始论证截然相反的结论。这似乎是让人难以接受的后果。基于这点,CP论题的反对者将矛头指向CP论题,认为是CP论题本身不成立导致了元模态可设想性论题的困难。而CP论题的支持者,比如查莫斯(D.Chalmers),认为CP论题不适用于任何形如□S的命题,并坚持将这类命题排除在CP论题的使用范围之外。在本文中,笔者对双方观点都进行了驳斥,并指出元模态可设想性论证的真正困难且将这个困难以一个两难的形式展示。

Meta-modal conceivability arguments are used to decide whether propositions taking the form of 2S are possibly true by appealing to the CP theses.However,any metamodal conceivability argument can be“inverted”to a parallel one which has the conclusion contrary to the original argument.This is a result that we are reluctant to accept.Based on this,opponents of the CP theses challenge them by holding that it is the failure of the CP theses that leads to the unacceptable consequence.Of course,proponents of the CP theses,such as D.Chalmers,refuse such a diagnosis.He holds that the CP theses don’t apply to any proposition taking the form of 2S and proposes to exclude modal propositions out of the scope of the CP theses.In this paper,I give objections to both sides and present the real problem for meta-modal conceivability arguments in the form of a dilemma.