股票期权激励、常规收入与高管风险承担——基于期权价值异质性的视角

Stock Option Incentive,Conventional Income and Executives' Risk-taking——Based on the Perspective of Heterogeneity of Option Value

基于经典代理理论和行为代理理论,本文提出股票期权激励同时具有预期价值和禀赋价值两种异质价值,将高管风险承担区分为决策型和业绩型后,实证研究发现:(1)股票期权激励预期价值与两类高管风险承担均呈现显著正相关关系,股票期权激励禀赋价值与两类高管风险承担均呈现显著负相关关系;(2)常规收入强化(弱化)了股票期权激励预期(禀赋)价值与高管风险承担的正(负)相关关系;(3)风险承担过度时,高管仍会因追逐预期价值继续承担更大风险。

Based on classical agency theory and behavioral agent theory,this paper puts forward two kinds of heterogeneous value of stock option incentive,prospective value and endowment value,this paper also divides executives’risk-taking into decision-making-based risk-taking and performance-based risk-taking,the conclusions are:(1)there is a significant positive(negative)correlation between the prospective(endowment)value of the stock option incentive and executives’risk-taking;(2)conventional income strengthens(weakens)the positive(negative)correlation between the prospective(endowment)value of stock option incentive and executives’risk-taking;(3)when the risk-taking is excessive,executives will continue to assume greater risks because of the pursuit of the prospective value.