摘要
构建企业与村合作供给土地整治项目的投资分担博弈模型,利用该模型分析企业与村的行为策略、博弈支付和均衡条件,计算得到均衡解。研究表明:(1)投资分担均衡主要受预期获得净收益的影响;(2)企业与村的投资分担博弈至少存在三个重要的均衡解,即两个端点均衡解和一个中点均衡解;(3)事前承诺或沟通,合作投资双方可从低效率或无效率陷阱中摆脱出来,达到更有效率的均衡。
This paper builds up an investment sharing game model for the land consolidation cooperation between enterprises and villages,and uses this model to analyze the behavioral strategy,game payoff and equilibrium condition of enterprises and villages,getting equilibrium solutions.The result shows that,firstly,investment sharing equilibrium is mainly influenced by expected net income;secondly,there are at least three important equilibrium solutions for the investment sharing game between enterprises and villages,which include two endpoint equilibrium solutions and one midpoint solution;thirdly,with prior promise or communication,the two sides can avoid low-efficiency or zero-efficiency in cooperation to reach a more efficient equilibrium.
作者
何丹
吴九兴
HE Dan;WU Jiu-xing(Department of Economy and Trade,Anhui Business College,Wuhu 241002,China;College of Territorial Resources and Tourism,Anhui Normal University,Wuhu 241002,China)
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(14YJC630138)
关键词
土地整治
合作供给
投资分担
博弈
land consolidation
cooperative provision
investment sharing
game
