双边平台投资行为对竞争市场均衡的影响研究

Research on the Influence of Two-sided Platform's Investment Behavior on the Equilibrium of Competitive Market

为进一步研究双边市场中平台企业的竞争策略与定价机制问题,本文在Hotelling模型基础上构建了同时包含投资与定价策略的双寡头竞争模型。在资源约束条件下分析平台企业的投资行为对市场均衡价格结构、市场份额分配、平台利润等的影响以及网络外部性在其中的调节作用。研究结果表明:在资源约束条件下,最优投资与定价水平是依赖于投资成本系数大小的双阈值决策问题;平台对投入资源的定价规则以及对双边用户的依赖程度受固有效用与交叉网络外部性之间大小关系的影响;平台的投资策略改变了市场份额的均匀分配并从相反方向影响了两平台的收益。相比较于传统单边市场,交叉网络外部性提高了投资策略在市场占有率方面的效率,使得平台企业在抢占市场份额方面更具竞争优势。此外,双边市场中的投资效应具有传递性,平台企业对一边市场的投资能通过网络外部性的作用影响另一边市场。

A two-sided platform is defined as a kind of intermediate enterprise connects two different types of users.They need to gain access to the same platform in order to be able to interact and the platform gets profits from their transactions.This format is becoming increasingly important in the view of both theorists and practitioners in the contemporary economy.In practice,two-sided platforms,such as the third-party payment platform Alipay,and the social media platform WeChat,have become an integral part of people s everyday lives.Platform economy has developed rapidly over the last few years and the two-sided platforms competitive strategies have become more and more diversified in the fierce market competition environment.Research on two-sided markets mainly focuses on skewed pricing strategies.The investment behavior of platforms in practice is widely observed,but research regarding investment of two-sided platforms is relatively scarce.Pricing mechanisms and other competitive strategies in two-sided market are quite different from those in a traditional one-sided market.So,a two-sided platform investment behavior is combined with pricing strategies to construct a game-theoretic model in a duopolistic competitive market.Based on the Hotelling model,this paper explores the influence of investment strategy on pricing level,market share and profits,and the moderating effect of network externality and investment cost.Our main contributions to the literature are as follows.First,the model based on a competitive market with resource constraints that this paper develops is closer to reality and can be more widely applied than the monopoly case.The single threshold decision in a monopolistic market becomes a double threshold decision about the investment cost and enterprise s resources.Second,when expanding the model to a competitive situation,we do not reduce the decision variable for the seller s pricing,which importantly affects the equilibrium solution.Third,we highlight the importance of inherent utility in pricing rules and the transitivity of the investment effect on two-sided markets from the results.The results show that the optimal investment level is a double threshold problem for investment costs when resources are sufficient.There are three optimal investment levels in this case.In contrast,when resources are relatively limited,an enterprise should invest at the maximum level.Platform s investment strategy changes the average allocation of market share and affected the benefits of the two platforms in the opposite direction.The investment platform will gain more profit from an investment strategy while reducing the profits of its competitors.Compared with one-sided markets,cross-group network externalities increase investment efficiency in terms of seizing market share.We also reveal the importance of inherent utility in pricing strategies based on the results.Whether users should be charged more for better service depends on the relative magnitude of the cross-group network externalities and inherent utility.There is a case where users will be charged less for better service.Moreover,the investment effect in two-sided market has transitivity.Platform enterprises investment strategy on one side can influence the other side of the market through network externality.The results have some practical implications for two-sided platforms and public regulatory agencies.First,more attention should be paid to promote users service and avoid blind price war.Second,traditional pricing rules should be abandoned and investment strategy enterprises should be re-examined from the perspective of two-sided markets.Third,for the transitivity of investment effect on two-sided markets,the enterprises can avoid investment barriers on one side and invest on the other side to reach the organizational goals indirectly.Finally,reducing barriers to entry appropriately would be a feasible way to promote market competition and reduce monopolies.