摘要
依据沪深A股主板市场2007-2015年样本数据,考量中国银行借款与商业信用融资的治理效应。结果显示:无论是国有控股公司还是民营公司,银行借款均对其过度投资行为存在诱发作用;与短期借款相比,长期借款对公司过度投资的诱发作用更加突出。结果表明,商业信用融资有助于抑制公司过度投资,且市场化程度越高的地区这种抑制作用越突出。
This paper discusses the governance effect of debt on overinvestment behavior of state-owned enterprises from two angles of view of debt source and debt structure.The results show that bank loans do not have a significant inhibitory effect on the excessive investment behavior of the company,and even the positive effect is induced.Among them,the long term loan induces the excessive investment behavior of the company more than the short-term borrowing,and the higher the ratio of commercial credit financing,the more help to curb excessive investment.At the same time,compared with the central and western regions,the commercial credit financing of listed companies in the eastern region has a greater inhibitory effect on the over investment.
作者
唐炳南
刘东皇
樊士德
Tang Bingnan;Liu Donghuang;Fan Shide(Business school,Nanjing University,Nanjing,Jiangsu 210093,China;Business Shcool,Jiangsu University of technolody,Changzhou,Jiangsu,213001;College of economics and trade,Nanjing University of audit,Nanjing,Jiangsu 211815,China)
出处
《财经理论与实践》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第2期22-27,共6页
The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金(16YJA790012)、江苏高校哲学社会科学研究重点项目(2014ZDIXM016)、江苏省“青蓝工程”青年骨干教师培养项目
