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基于合作博弈的城市配送联盟收益分配研究 被引量:1

Research on Income Distribution of City Distribution Alliance Based on the Cooperative Game Theory
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摘要 收益分配的合理性是城市配送联盟可持续发展的基础。因此能否提出科学合理的收益分配方案,直接关系到城市配送企业联盟的成败。本文研究了城市物流配送企业联盟情况下的收益分配问题,通过Shapley值法对城市配送联盟进行初始收益分配,引入联盟收益分配影响因素进行定量分析,采用层次分析法确定其权重,提出了基于合作博弈的城市配送联盟收益分配模型,通过实例分析,结果显示,改进后的联盟收益分配方案不仅保证了Shapley值法的收益分配原则,而且能体现联盟企业成员的重要性,收益分配更加合理,有利于促进城市配送联盟可持续发展。 Reasonable income distribution is the foundation of sustainable development of city distribution alliance.Therefore,the scientific and reasonable interest distribution plan is the key to the success of the alliance of city distribution enterprises.This paper studies the problem of the income distribution of city distribution enterprises alliance and carries out the initial income distribution by the Shapley value method,introduces the influence factors of alliance income distribution,adopts AHP to find the weight,and proposes the income distribution model of city distribution alliance.Through an example analysis,according to the researching results,the improved alliance income distribution plan not only ensures income allocation principle of the Shapley value method,but also reflects the importance of the members of the alliance,and income distribution is more reasonable,which is beneficial to promoting the sustainable development of city distribution alliance.
作者 陈碎雷 CHEN Sui-lei(Zhejiang Industry&Trade Vocational College,Wenzhou,325003,China)
出处 《浙江工贸职业技术学院学报》 2018年第1期42-45,共4页 Journal of Zhejiang Industry & Trade Vocational College
基金 中国物流学会研究课题(2016CSLKT3-042) 温州市科技局研究项目(R20170048)
关键词 城市配送 联盟 合作博弈 收益分配 city distribution alliance cooperative game theory income distribution
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