动物疫情公共危机中地方政府与农户的决策行为博弈分析

An Analysis on the Decision-making Behavior of Local Government and Farmers in the Public Crisis of Animal Epidemic Based on Evolutionary Game

重大动物疫情对于人类生命健康和养殖业生产都具有严重的危害,目前控制动物疫情蔓延的主要手段是对疫区内的病畜进行及时的隔离扑杀。在实际隔离扑杀过程中,地方政府作为隔离工作的主导者和疫区农户之间存在博弈关系。基于政府公信力和官民信任感,构建了地方政府和疫区农户的演化博弈模型,并从动态角度分析两个主体的演化稳定策略和演化规律,从而找出影响演化路径的因素,为合理的疫区隔离补偿策略提供一定的参考。地方政府和疫区农户在完成疫区隔离扑杀目标和住户得到合理补偿的双赢基础上进行合作,是疫区隔离问题的帕累托最优均衡。最后,针对隔离补偿机制中存在的问题,提出减少强制隔离扑杀引发的群体性突发事件、完善强制隔离制度和补偿政策的相关建议。

The outbreak of animal epidemics has seriously affected the safety of human life,and the timely isolation and control of infectious diseases is a major means to control the spread of animal epidemic.It is of great practical significance to explore the isolation and control of major animal epidemics.In the process of actual isolation,there is a game relationship between the local government as the leader of the isolation work and the residents in the epidemic area.Based on the government credibility and the trust between the government and the people,the evolutionary game model of the local government and the epidemic area residents is constructed and analyzed.From the dynamic perspective,the evolutionary stability strategy and evolution rule of the two subjects were studied so as to find out the influencing factors of the evolution path,and provide some reference for the reasonable isolation strategy in epidemic area.The win-win cooperation between the local government and households who achieved isolation and killing objectives in epidemic area and residents who got reasonable compensation was the Pareto Optimality to solve isolation issues in epidemic area.Finally,in order to tackle problems existing in isolation compensation mechanism,it is proposed to reduce unexpected group events caused by forced isolation in epidemic areas,improve compulsory isolation system and compensation policy.