竞争环境下存在品牌差异化的供应链权力结构模型

Power structure modeling for supply chain with differentiated brands under competitive condition

针对由两个品牌差异化竞争制造商和一个零售商组成的供应链系统,考虑两个制造商各自生产一种品牌差异化的替代品,并以批发价格提供给零售商,分别构建了由各个制造商主导和零售商主导的两种权力结构模型,并得到三种均衡解。进而分析了品牌差异化、权力结构等因素对均衡结果的影响,考察不平衡的权力结构对消费者剩余和供应链系统利润的影响,并用数值算例予以考察。研究结果表明,不同权力结构对零售商的最优定价决策和产品需求不会造成影响;在制造商主导结构下,高(普通)品牌价值产品制造商获得的利润份额要高(低)于零售商主导结构下的值,而零售商拥有主导权时也能够获得更高的利润份额;从消费者剩余和供应链系统利润视角,不同权力结构并不会对其造成影响。

This paper investigates a supply chain in which a retailer is supplied by two manufacturers with differentiated brands,a good brand and an average brand.According to the power structure differences,and considering the environment factors such as brand differentiation,two types multiple-stage game models are constructed,which are the Stackelberg game models dominated by the retailer and manufacturers respectively.By the solutions,we derive,for each manufacturer,the optimal pricing of the system under each power structure.Further,we analyze the effects of the environment factors on the equilibriums,and consequently compare the system profits under different power structures companied with numerical examples.The results show that,different power structures will not affect retailers’optimal pricing and demand.Different from the retailer’s dominance,leads to the higher profit for the good brand manufacturer and the lower for the average brand manufacturer or retailer under the manufacturers’dominance.Moreover,no dominance among supply chain members(the two manufacturers and the retailer)leads to the highest profit for the entire supply chain and consumer surplus.