合约不完全实施的两种分析框架比较研究

A Comparative Research on Two Analytical Frameworks of Incomplete Contract Enforcement

本文比较不完全合约和完全合约理论处理合约实施的方法。不完全合约理论认为资产专用性和合约实施制度质量同时决定效率扭曲程度,只要是不完全实施,效率必然扭曲。而完全合约理论强调合约不完全实施是代理人信息类型和合约实施制度质量共同作用的产物,合约实施制度质量本身未必造成效率扭曲。事前合约的期望社会剩余比较表明,合约实施制度质量改善对社会福利提高具有积极意义。尽管这两类分析框架选择的参照系和关注的角度有所不同,但基本结论是一致的,即随着制度质量的提高,潜在的效率扭曲在下降。

This paper makes a comparison of two different methodologies of dealing with the contract enforcement problem,i.e.,the incomplete contract theory and the complete contract theory.The theory of incomplete contract recognizes that asset specificity and the quality of contract enforcement work together to determine the extent of efficiency distortion.As long as the contract is incompletely enforced,there will be efficiency distortion.However,the complete contract theory emphasizes that the incomplete enforcement is the combined consequence of agent s type and the quality of contract enforcement.The efficiency of contract enforcement itself will not necessarily result in efficiency distortion.The comparison of ex ante contract social surplus indicates that the implication of contract enforcement will positively affect social welfare.Although these two analytical frameworks choose different references and focuses,the basic conclusion is consistent,that is,with the improvement of contract enforcement,the extent of efficiency distortion will be relieved.