基于演化博弈的我国建筑市场承包商诚信行为研究

Research on Contractor Credit Behavior in Construction Market Based on the Evolutionary Game Theory

以建筑市场业主单位和承包商两类群体为研究对象,运用演化博弈理论,建立二者动态博弈的支付函数和复制动态方程,分析未实施激励和实施激励政策对博弈结果的影响。研究结果表明:实现最优博弈均衡的关键在于使承包商的守信收益大于失信收益,这取决于业主单位实施的奖惩、合作机制以及政府的引导政策。改善建筑市场诚信环境应采取的措施包括建立诚信承包商目录,实施长期合作机制;建立守信激励、失信惩戒的奖惩制度,实施差异化监管;建立统一的信用信息平台,加强信用评价结果的应用。

This paper investigates into the game between the developer group and contractor group in construction markets.By using the evolutionary game theory,the paper establishes the utility function and dynamic equation between their game and analyses the game results when the developer group implements the incentive policy and otherwise.The research shows that the key factor to achieve the optimal equilibrium result is that the contractor's non-credit income must be less than the credit income,which depends on the incentive and cooperation mechanism implemented by the developer group and the government's policy.To improve the credibility environment of the construction market,three main measures should be taken,which includes establishing the integrity of the contractor directory and implementing long-term cooperation mechanism;establishing trustworthy incentives,dishonesty disciplinary punishment system and implementing a differential regulation policy between the credit and non-credit contractors;building a unified credit information platform and strengthening the application of credit evaluation results.