摘要
绿色建筑作为未来建筑的发展方向,受多方主体不断演化博弈的影响。文章将建设单位和施工企业作为关键影响主体,运用演化博弈理论,构建有限理性条件下的支付函数,建立复制者动态方程模型,分析建设单位和施工企业的演化稳定策略。然后引入政府补贴变量,分析在政府补贴情形下关键主体的策略变化。研究表明:建设单位和施工企业博弈双方的策略选择与自身的收益以及对方的策略选择相关。在政府补贴条件下,博弈双方选择绿色建筑的倾向性显著增强,由复制者动态方程可知,博弈双方的策略选择朝着最优演化稳定的均衡方向发展。
As the future direction of the development of the building袁green building is influenced by the evolution of multi party subject.In this paper袁the construction units and the construction enterprises are the key influence body袁based on the evolutionary game theory袁it constructs the payment function under the limited rationality condition袁establishes replicator dynamic equation model袁and analyzes the evolutionary stable strategy of the construction units and the construction enterprises.Then the government subsidy variables are introduced to analyze the strategic changes of the key players in the case of government subsidies.The research shows that the strategy choice of both the construction unit and the construction enterprise are related to their own income and the choice of the other party's strategy.Under the condition of government subsidy袁the tendency of the two parties to choose green building is significantly enhanced袁from the replicator's dynamic equation袁we can see that the strategy choice of both sides of the game is to develop towards the optimal evolutionary stable equilibrium.
作者
王波
WANG Bo(School of Civil Engineering and Architecture,Southwest University of Science and Technology,Mianyang Sichuan 621010,China;School of Economics and Management,Southwest Jiaotong University,Chengdu Sichuan 610031,China)
出处
《技术经济与管理研究》
北大核心
2018年第4期17-21,共5页
Journal of Technical Economics & Management
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(51108393)
四川省循环经济研究中心项目(XHJJ-1510)
关键词
政府补贴
绿色建筑
关键主体
生态环境
Government subsidy
Green building
Key subject
Ecological environment