股票期权激励、行权业绩条件与真实盈余管理

Stock option incentive, exercise rights vesting performance requirements and real earnings management

本文以2006到2014年期间实施行股权激励计划的A股上市公司为研究样本,利用股权激励计划中行权业绩条件的数据,对股权激励与真实盈余管理之间的关系进行了实证研究。研究发现,相对于"非激励性"股权激励计划的公司,"激励性"股权激励计划的公司实施真实盈余管理的程度更大;上市公司股权激励计划所设定的行权业绩条件相对于公司过去实际业绩水平越严格的,管理层实施真实盈余管理的程度越大。还发现,为了达到行权业绩条件,上市公司管理层会综合使用真实盈余管理和应计盈余管理;集中的股权结构能够在一定程度上抑制真实盈余管理程度。研究结果意味着,合理设定行权业绩条件对于股权激励有效性至关重要;优化股权结构对抑制股权激励引发的真实盈余管理行为具有重要意义。

Since China Securities Regulatory Commission issued the“Rules on Administration of Listed Company Equity Incentive”in 2006,an increasing number of listed companies have launched the equity incentive plan.However,both theoretical and empirical studies show that the equity incentive system aimed to solve the principal-agent problems often causes the new moral hazard,such as earnings management behavior implemented by managers.In many empirical studies earnings management is defined as accrued earnings management.However,very few studies focus on if equity incentive compensation contracts will trigger managers to implement real earnings management motivation.On the other hand,performance-based-equity incentive is implemented in China,which is significantly different from the executive equity incentive implemented in the United States and other countries for a long time.For performance-based-equity incentive,whether stock options must be based on whether exercise rights vesting performance requirements is achieved.Moreover,whether stock options can be granted and whether the stock can be sold after stock options are exercised must be based on whether exercise rights vesting performance requirements are achieved.Therefore,exercise performance conditions become a basic element of equity incentive plan in China.How do performance-based-equity incentive affect earnings management behavior?Whether do managers in China implement real earnings management to achieve the exercise rights vesting performance requirements?These problems still lack of research based on the examples of equity incentive in China.Using samples of listed companies in Chinese A share market which implemented equity incentive plans during the 2006-2014,this paper investigates the relationship between equity incentive and real earnings management based on the data of exercise rights vesting performance requirements in the equity incentive plan.This paper finds that the degree of real earnings management implemented by the company with an"incentive"equity incentive plan is greater than the one implemented by the company with a"non-incentive"equity incentive plan.The higher the exercise rights vesting performance requirements compared to company's past actual performance level,the greater the extent of real earnings management induced is.In order to achieve the exercise rights vesting performance requirements,the listing corporation's managers will comprehensively use real earnings management and accrual-based earnings management.Concentration of ownership structure can restrain real earnings management level to a certain extent.The results show that it is very important to set a reasonable performance level in the equity incentive plans.Optimizing the ownership structure is significant for the suppression of the real earnings management behavior caused by equity incentive.The paper makes two major areas of contribution.First,using exercise rights vesting performance requirements set in the equity incentive plan measure equity incentive intensity is an innovation on the measurement methods of equity incentive intensity designed for Chinese situation.Second,this paper enriches the current literatures about the relationship between equity incentives and earnings management from the perspective of real activities earnings management.