基于动态信誉的飞机推出时隙分配Stackelberg博弈

Stackelberg Game of Aircraft Pushback Slot Allocation Based on Dynamic Credibility

为了惩罚航空公司的推出违约行为,结合Stackelberg博弈研究违约行为下的飞机推出时隙分配问题.提出动态信誉优先理论,设计基于动态信誉的飞机推出时隙分配混合决策流程,确定飞机-时隙对;为了优化给定飞机-时隙对下的推出时刻,将信誉机制下的推出时隙分配问题描述为Stackelberg博弈,并进一步转化为以人均停机位等待时间及各个航空公司单架飞机的平均地面成本为上下层目标的双层规划模型,提出改进人工鱼群算法,改进鱼群行为及最优解选取准则.将模型与算法应用于新郑机场飞机推出时隙分配,仿真结果证实了模型及算法的优势.

In order to punish the pushback operation of airline,the problem of aircraft pushback slot allocation was studied with Stackelberg game theory.First,the concept of dynamic credibility priority was proposed,and a hybrid decision-making process of aircraft pushback slot allocation based on dynamic credibility was designed to determine the aircraft-slot pairs.Second,in order to optimize the aircraft pushback time in given aircraft-slot pairs,the pushback slot allocation under credibility mechanism was described as a Stackelberg game model,then the model was transformed into a bi-level programming model which takes the average gate hold time as the upper level and makes average surface cost of single aircraft experienced by the airlines as the lower level.Third,the improved artificial fish algorithm(IAFSA)was proposed to improve the fish school behavior and selection criteria of optimum solution.Finally,the proposed model and algorithm was applied to the Xinzheng International Airport,and the simulation results confirm that the proposed method has the advantages in aircraft pushback slot allocation.