基于主体不平等的跨国界河流水资源分配的破产博弈研究

Bankruptcy Game of Transboundary River Water Resources Allocation Based on Subject Inequality

基于破产理论和讨价还价博弈,构建水资源分配的破产博弈模型。借鉴国际水法,构建主体在水资源分配谈判中的议价能力评价指标体系,将议价能力运用到破产博弈模型中,突出主体在水资源分配中的不平等性,减少水资源分配量与贡献、需求量和对水资源依赖程度的非对称性;结合主体的谈判破裂点,根据主体满意度函数的联动函数寻找水资源分配的最优解,使分配能同时满足个体理性和集体理性,并对澜沧江-湄公河流域进行实例研究。

Based on the bankruptcy theory and the bargaining game,the paper constructs a bankruptcy game model of water resources allocation.It constructs an index system of bargaining power in the water resources allocation negotiations on the basis of the international water law and uses the projection pursuit model to calculate the bargaining power of each country to highlight the inequality among different countries in water resources allocation.Thereby,it is possible to reduce the asymmetry relationship among the allocation of water resources,the contribution of countries and the degree of dependence on river.It is shown that the stability of the distribution of the bankruptcy game model is higher than the other classical distribution methods of the bankruptcy theory through the case study of the Lancang-Mekong River Basin.