考虑用户成本的双边平台动态定价模型

Dynamic Pricing in Two-sided Platform Considering Customer Costs

现有有关双边市场的研究多建立在平台服务成本为常数的静态模型基础上,而这与现实中用户重复购买以及平台获客成本持续增加的事实相悖。基于此,将用户成本引入完全垄断的双边平台两期动态博弈模型,研究发现随着获取新买方成本的增加,平台维护老买方的意愿不断增强,而获取新买方的意愿则受新老买方的成本差异和交叉网络外部性共同影响;相比于UP,平台实施BBPD有利于利润的增加;BBPD使得平台有对老买方制定高于新买方价格的倾向,且受交叉网络外部性影响,降价并非是平台吸引新买方的必然选择。

Researches about existing two-sided markets are mainly based on a static model with constant platform service cost,which is contrary to the fact of repeating purchase as well as the increasing cost of acquiring customers on platforms.Based on this,we lead customer costs into 2-period dynamic game model for complete monopoly platform,The results are as follows:With the increase in the cost of acquiring new buyers,the willingness of the platform to maintain the old buyer is increasing.However,acquiring new buyers intension is related to the cost differences among the new and old buyers as well as the impact of the cross networks externality;Compare to UP,theimplementation of the BBPD in platform can increase the profit of the platform;BBPD forms a tendency of setting higher prices for the old buyers than the new buyers,and with the impact of the cross networks externality,price reduction is not an inevitable choice to attract new buyers for a platform.