随机供需下的供应链返利和惩罚契约协调研究

Coordination Research of Supply Chain Rebate and Penalty Contract under Random Supply and Demand

针对带有风险偏好的二级供应链系统,建立了由一个供应商和一个零售商组成的Stackelberg博弈模型。设计了带有不同强度参数的返利和惩罚契约。利用CVa R理论探讨风险厌恶的零售商和风险中性的供应商实现供应链协调,契约参数的设置及成员的利润分配情况。数值计算分析验证了返利和惩罚契约协调供应链的有效性。

A Stackelberg game model composed of supplier and retail was established for the gradetwo supply chain system with risk preference.rebate and penalty contract with different intensity parameters was designed.CVaR was used to discuss the supply chain coordination of risk aversion retailer and risk neutral supplier,setting of contract parameters and profit distribution condition among members.Finally,numerical calculation analysis verifies the efficacy of rebate and penalty contract coordinating supply chain.