摘要
文中针对电商外卖为代表的网络易逝型食品在生产、加工、配送等供应链环节出现的质量隐患,利用演化博弈的方法分析在演化稳定状态下不同供应商对食品质量控制重视程度的倾向,对利导因子和限制因子影响供应链选择食品质量控制策略的双重作用机制进行研究。然后运用信号博弈的手段,比较了优质供应商和劣质供应商在三种贝叶斯平衡下的策略表现,指出不同食品供应商在市场竞争中处于有利地位需要的条件,为政府利用调控手段进行市场行为导向提供决策支持。
In order to solve quality problems of perishable food online such as take-away and ensure food safety in production,processing,distribution and other supply chain links,this article analyze the evolutionary stable equilibrium reached by different suppliers who show different tend to food quality control through the method of evolutionary game,and attempts to study the influence on the leading factors and limiting factors which suppliers consider with when they choose food control strategy.Then,it uses the method of signaling game to guide the high quality food suppliers in a favorable position in the market competition,and finally provides the decision support for the government to regulate the market behavior.
作者
孙冬石
吴耕
SUN Dong-shi;WU Geng(Business Management Department,Dalian Neusoft University of Information,Dalian 116023,China)
出处
《物流工程与管理》
2018年第4期16-19,共4页
Logistics Engineering and Management
基金
辽宁省2017年自然科学基金项目"全渠道模式下基于服务创新的供应链整合与优化研究"(编号20170540053)的阶段性研究成果
关键词
易逝食品
演化博弈
信号博弈
控制机制
perishable food,evolutionary game,signal game,control mechanism