亏损公司高管薪酬激励:现金还是持股

Executive Compensation Incentive in Loss-making Companies: Cash or Stock Ownership

在解决上市公司管理层与所有者之间的代理问题上,管理层持股、薪酬激励被认为是一种较为直接的途径。以往的研究往往只针对管理层激励对盈利的上市公司是否有影响,然而薪酬激励制度对亏损或处于财务困境中的公司是否依然发挥作用同样值得思考。本文以A股亏损上市公司为研究对象,实证检验了管理层薪酬激励方式对亏损上市公司扭亏行为和公司价值的影响。研究发现,管理层持股对公司扭亏没有显著激励作用,管理层股权激励降低了亏损公司价值,而管理层现金薪酬的激励效应显著,通过进一步区分产权性质分组检验发现,国有企业中管理层薪酬现金激励能促进公司价值的增长,而在非国有企业中则没能发挥相应的作用。本文的研究进一步明确了薪酬激励在亏损公司中的作用,对亏损上市公司扭亏中管理层薪酬合约的制定提供经验证据参考。

In solving the agency problem between management and owner of listed company,management shareholding and compensation incentive plays a critical role.Previous research mostly focused on the effects of executive compensation incentive on the earnings of listed companies.However,it is also worth considering whether the compensation incentive system still plays a role in the loss-making or financial distress of companies.In this paper,we test the impact on corporate value with the different form of executive compensation incentive in loss-making listed companies.It finds that the management shareholding has no significant incentive effect on the companies loss reversal,and reduces the value of the loss-making companies,but the incentive effect of cash pay is significant.By further distinguishing property ownership types,it is found that the management cash compensation can promote the growth of company value of state-owned enterprises,while it doesn t play a corresponding role in non-state-owned enterprises.This study further clarifies the role of compensation incentive in loss-making listed companies,and provides empirical evidence for the designing of management compensation contracts in loss-making listed companies.