基于谈判地位不对等的BIM参与方风险分配博弈模型

Game Model for BIM Participants' Risk Allocation Based on Unequal Negotiation Status

针对目前BIM项目风险分配大多数是基于谈判地位对等的情形,结合建筑行业实际情况,分析BIM参与双方面临的主要风险类型,从参与双方谈判地位不对等的角度,基于轮流出价的讨价还价理论,对完全信息和不完全信息两种动态博弈情况进行分析,分别建立BIM项目中业主方和施工方的风险分配博弈模型,并用实际工程案例对此模型的可靠性进行验证,结果表明:业主方采取强势地位向施工方进行风险转移的份额是重要的风险分配参数,控制此参数能够有效地规避风险,并且针对不同的风险类型业主方转移的风险概率不同,此外信息在谈判中起到决定性的作用,应尽量不让对方知道自身底细。此方法为BIM项目的风险分配问题提供参考价值,具备一定的实际指导意义。

Comparing to the current research on BIM project’s risk allocation based on the equal negotiation status,combined with the actual situation of the construction industry,the paper analyzes the main risk types faced by the participants.From the perspective of participants in the unequal negotiation status,a bargaining game model is constructed for BIM participants’risk allocation under the conditions of complete and incomplete information respectively.Using case to verify the reliability of the model,the results show that the probability value that the owners takes the strong position to carry on the risk transfer to the builders is an important allocation parameter,and controlling this parameter can effectively avoid the risk and different risk types have different risk probability.Information play a decisive role in the negotiations.We should try not to let each other know ourselves details.This method for the BIM project's risk allocation problem provide reference value and practical guidance.