三方运输联盟成本分配的稳定性分析

Study on the Stability of Cost Allocation of Tripartite Transportation Alliance

基于合作博弈理论,应用核的概念分析了三方运输联盟是否存在稳定的成本分配方案,然后应用Shapley值法与核仁法对其进行成本节约分配。研究结果表明:Shapley值分配法能体现出参与各方的贡献,但是当核非空时其不能保证分配结果处于核之中,因而不能保证联盟的稳定性;而基于核仁分配法则使各参与方分配结果趋于平均化,而且一定处于核之中,因此更能保证联盟稳定运行。

Based on the concept of cooperative game theory,the nuclear concept is applied to analyze whether there is a stable cost allocation scheme in the tripartite transportation alliance.Then the Shapley value method and nucleolus method are used to distribute the cost saving.The results showed that the Shapley value allocation method can reflect the contribution of the parties involved,but when the nuclear is not empty,it can not guarantee the distribution result in the nucleus,so it can not guarantee the stability of the alliance.However,based on the kernel assignment rule,the distribution results of each participant tend to be average and must be in the nuclei,so it can ensure the stable operation of the alliance.