全程追溯制度下的食品企业与政府的演化博弈分析

A Full-process Traceability Access to the Evolutionary Game between Governments and Food Enterprises

为了探讨政府监管部门如何对食品追溯企业的信息共享行为进行监管,采用演化博弈理论,构建了食品追溯企业信息共享行为和政府监管部门行为的演化博弈模型,分析了二者在溯源信息共享中的稳定策略,并利用数值仿真演示了不同参数下模型的演化路径。研究结果表明,政府的声誉报酬和奖励、企业共享虚假信息时的处罚力度及第三方监管成功率等因素影响演化结果。最后,结合研究结论,为政府监管部门如何提高溯源信息质量提出了相关的政策建议。

In order to examine how governmental supervision departments supervise the information sharing of food traceability enterprises,this paper has built the evolutionary game model to analyze the information sharing of food traceability enterprises and the measures of governmental supervision departments based on the evolutionary game theory.It explores the stable strategies used by both sides in sharing traceable information and has demonstrated the evolutionary equilibrium with respect to different parameters on the basis of numerical simulations.The research results show that the governments’payment and rewards for food traceability enterprises’reputation,penalty to those enterprises for sharing false information and the success rate of third party surveillances all have an impact on the evolutionary game results.The paper also gives some suggestions for supervision departments to improve the quality of traceable information.