股权激励、契约异质性与企业绩效的动态增长

Equity Incentive,Contract heterogeneity and the Dynamic Increase of Corporate Financial Performance

在考察股权激励对企业绩效动态影响的基础上,本文检验了微观契约条款的作用效果和影响机制。研究发现:经过一年的滞后期后,股权激励对企业绩效表现出了持续三年的提升作用,且呈现了先升后降的分布特征;限制性股票的短期效果更好,股票期权的长期绩效提升作用更佳,持续时间更长;激励力度越大、激励对象越广,股权激励对企业绩效的提升作用越强、持续期也越久,激励性较弱的契约则不存在明显的动态效应;激励条件严格、激励期限较长的契约能实现更强、更持久的绩效提升作用,缺乏约束性的方案仅存在短期效果,且在实施后的第四年出现业绩反转,显现出负效应。进一步研究发现,股权激励是通过利益协同效应、风险承担效应和金手铐效应三个可能的渠道驱动企业绩效的动态增长,但具体的驱动机制因契约条款设置的不同而存在明显差异。

As an important component of corporate governance mechanism,equity incentive plans have been rapidly implemented among Chinese listed companies.Especially under the present background of mixed ownership reform,the implementation of equity incentive has ushered in new opportunity and its governance status has been further highlighted.Whether equity incentive plan is an efficient governance mechanism or just a tool for rent-seeking?Although tremendous effort has been directed toward characterizing the link between equity incentive and corporate performance,the existing literature still remains inconsistent and mixed.Previous studies on equity incentive effect were mainly based on a“black-box”analysis pattern and a short-term evaluation timeframe,which overlooked the heterogeneity of contractual terms and the dynamics of incentive effect.According to the contract theory,all institutional arrangements are contractual relationships,and the terms design are the most central part of the contracts.As a complex and multi-dimensional contract,the effect of equity incentive plans depends on the design of key contractual terms.However,most current studies simply regard equity incentive plans as homogeneous contracts,which may ignore or underestimate the micro heterogeneity of different contract terms.In addition,although it is generally accepted that equity incentive is the most effective and sustainable incentive mechanism,no empirical research has been conducted to examine the dynamic effect of equity incentive on corporate performance under a long timeframe.In contrary,because of the difficulty in obtaining data of sufficient frequency and duration and the limitation on metrology identification method for analysis,most prior empirical studies have been limited to a static or short-term analysis perspective,which may significantly underestimate and incompletely characterize the effect of equity incentive on corporate performance.This paper investigates the dynamic effect of equity incentive and how this relationship can be moderated by the arrangements of key contractual terms of equity compensation plans.Results show that:equity incentive exists dynamic effect,which can last for three years after a one-year lagged effect and presents an inverted u-shaped distribution characteristic.Restricted stock has better effect in the short run,while stock option shows more significant and persistent effect in the long run.Compared to contracts with less equity and objectives,contracts have stronger and persistent performance-improving effect when more equity is granted to more employees.Equity incentive with stricter vesting conditions and longer expiration periods has stronger and more lasting incentive effect,while contracts with less constrains exist only short-term incentive effect,and even appear negative effects from the fourth year.Further research finds that interest alignment effect,risk-taking effect and golden handcuffs effect are important channels for equity incentive in improving corporate financial performance.However,these mediating mechanisms are different in contracts with heterogeneous terms design.This research contributes to the literature in the following three aspects:Firstly,Assessing the dynamic effect of equity incentive from a long-term time frame,this paper not only can capture the effect of equity incentive in a more comprehensive and scientific way,but also may provide a new perspective for systematic evaluation of equity incentive plans.Secondly,this paper investigates the potential factors in moderating the dynamic effect of equity incentive from the micro level of contract terms,which provides new research perspectives for clarifying the mixed associations between equity incentive and corporate performance and offers important practical implications in the design of incentive contracts.Thirdly,by investigating the internal driving mechanism between equity incentive and corporate performance,and how the driving mechanism differentiate in contracts with heterogeneous contractual terms design,this paper may help open the“black box”of equity incentive effect on corporate performance.