摘要
本文以中债资信的成立为研究背景,分析了中立评级机构的进入对发行人付费评级质量及债券市场的影响。研究基于中债资信给出更低评级的现象展开,主要发现:在发行市场上,中债资信给出较低主体评级的发行人所发行的债券,发行成本较高;在交易市场上,中债资信做出评级后债券收益率升高,且具有长期性。更为重要的是,在中债资信市场份额较大、影响力较强的行业中的公司,其发行人付费评级水平较低,评级虚高的问题得到抑制;而且,抑制效果产生的原因是发行人付费评级机构的声誉机制,而非学习机制。
Employing Chinas first neutral credit rating agency-China Bond Rating Co,Ltd(CBRC)as the research background,this paper analyzes the reaction of existing issuerpaid credit rating agencies and the bond market towards CBRCs new neutral ratingWe mainly find that companies with lower ratings by CBRC issue bonds in higher interests in the bond issuance marketThese results also exist in the bond trading market,where bonds yield to maturity rises up after CBRCs lower rating in both short and long termsWe further show that after the entrance of CBRC,existing issuerpaid credit rating agencies will downgrade their ratings and this adjustment is more obvious in industries with higher CBRC occupation,which,in fact,has weakened irrational high rating conditionPossible explanation for adjustment of issuerpaid credit rating is the reputation mechanism rather than the study mechanism.
作者
孟庆斌
张强
吴卫星
王宇西
MENG Qingbin;ZHANG Qiang;WU Weixing;WANG Yuxi(Renmin University of China,100872;University of International Business and Economics,100029)
出处
《财贸经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第5期53-70,共18页
Finance & Trade Economics
基金
自然科学基金面上项目"卖空机制
私有信息与知情交易"(71772174)
自然科学基金青年项目"政府监管
市场监督与公司信用债券定价"(71302156)
关键词
公司信用债券
中立评级机构
发行人付费评级
评级虚高
声誉机制
Corporate Credit Bond
Neutral Credit Rating Agencies
Issuerpaid Credit Rating Agencies
Irrational High Rating
Reputation Mechanism