构成要件错误的本质:故意行为危险的偏离

Essence of Error in Constitutive Elements: Deviated Danger of Intentional Act

关于构成要件错误,法定符合说与具体符合说的分析视角是效果论,通过比对预想结果与实际结果来决定结果归属,然而这一分析路径并不能为结果归属提供实质根据。相反,考察危险发生机理的机理论能够揭示错误的本质,为结果归属提供实质根据。例如就打击错误而言,行为人的一个行为同时制造了故意行为危险和过失行为危险;前者具有目的性与支配性,后者具有盲目性与任意性,对二者不能等同视之,认为故意行为危险与过失行为危险具有同一性的观点难以成立。若结果不是故意行为危险的实现,而是过失行为危险的实现,亦即危险发生了实质偏离,则结果不能归属于故意。关于结果归属的判断,罗克辛的计划实现理论、弗里施的风险理论、普珀的故意危险理论均存在不足,而故意行为危险的实现标准具有合理性。依此判断,故意行为危险在对象错误中并未发生偏离,在打击错误中发生了偏离;而在各种因果关系错误中,是否发生偏离需作具体分析。

Regarding the issue of error of constitutive elements,the analyses from both the perspective of statutory confirmation and the perspective of idiographic confirmation are based on the theory of effect.However,the comparison of impact cannot provide an essential basis for the imputed result.The theory of reason,which focuses on investigating the reason of danger,may reveal the essence of error and provide an adequate foundation for the imputed result.For instance,as far as striking error is concerned,an action of the doer would result in both the danger of intentional action and the danger of negligent action at the same time.The former has its aim,dominative motivation,and direction,whereas the latter is arbitrary and aimless.If they are regarded as the same,analysis cannot be convincing.If the result of error is not the accomplishment of the danger of intentional action but a result of the danger of the negligent act,in other words,if danger has fundamentally deviated from intention,the result would not be imputed.Regarding imputed result,Roxin’s theory of accomplishing plan,Frisch’s theory of risk,and Puppe’s theory of intentional danger have all failed to convincingly deal with this issue.However,the approach that differentiates deviated danger of intentional action from accomplishing danger of intentional action is reasonable.Consequently,if the danger of intentional action does not deviate from a striking object but makes a striking error,the causes of the error in a complicated situation should be analyzed in light of the concrete situation.