征纳合谋、寻租与企业逃税

Collusion,Rent-seeking and Tax Evasion

在不完善的税收征管体制下,具备自由裁量权的税收征管人员会通过接受贿赂的方式来纵容企业逃税,征纳双方之间的合谋行为事实上是引发税收收入流失的重要原因。基于2010—2014年中国上市公司的微观层面数据,本文从经验上考察了征纳合谋对于企业所得税逃税的影响。以企业的业务招待费支出占比作为其贿赂支出的代理变量,我们发现,企业的业务招待费支出占比越高,其逃税程度也越高。同时,由于合谋的动机是为了逃税,业务招待费支出对于企业逃税的提升作用主要存在于名义税率较高的企业,而在享受税收优惠的企业中则不明显。最后,由于反腐败力度的提升增加了征纳双方合谋的成本,降低了合谋的意愿,研究发现,2012年12月中央"八项规定"实施之后,业务招待费支出对于企业逃税的影响显著下降。

Imperfect tax institutions usually empower tax enforcement officers with discretionary power.Under conditions of asymmetric information or a lack of supervision,tax enforcement officers who pursue their own interests will hide themselves behind the normal tax system while colluding with enterprises.In exchange for bribes,these tax enforcement officers will turn a blind eye to a companies tax evasion or even fraud.A large number of studies have explored the factors affecting corporate tax evasion from different perspectives,such as statutory tax rate,market competition pressure,macroscopic financial systems,and internal governance environment.However,due to the lack of an effective measure of collusion,and the fact that incentives for tax enforcement officers to collude are not embedded within the existing framework,there is little research on the effect of collusion between tax supervisors and taxpayers on tax evasion.Using China’s tax institutional background and the micro-data of listed companies,this study attempts to examine the impact of collusion on corporate tax evasion.As in other developing countries,whether they are in early or late stages of development,China’s tax collection and management system is characterized by the large discretionary power of tax administrators over the determination of companies actual tax burden,particularly for corporate income tax.For example,due to their role in the deduction of corporate income tax and the identification of asset losses,tax collectors individual judgments can directly determine the level of corporate tax burden.As a result,collusion is common in tax collection,which has been highlighted by the high incidence of corruption cases in China’s tax collection system.This study uses the business entertainment expenditures at the firm level as a measure of collusion,and uses the book-tax income difference to measure tax evasion.In China’s accounting standards,business entertainment expenses include a wide range of items,such as tourism,travel,catering,and purchase of gifts for customers,which are normal production operations and marketing public relations expenses.But in practice,due to the difficulty in identifying legitimate and illegitimate expenses,business entertainment expenses have also been widely used by enterprises to hide their bribery of government officials and expenses to maintain political and commercial relations.This study demonstrates a strict positive relationship between business entertainment expenses and corporate tax evasion.We find that the higher the proportion of corporate entertainment expenses,the greater the tax evasion in corporate income,especially after excluding the tax avoidance channel for entertainment expenses based on pretax deduction.Further,the above relationships vary with the regional corruption level and the strength of corporate political connections.In regions with high levels of corruption,more tax is evaded for similar amounts of business entertainment expenses.However,enterprises political connections substitute for the incentive to collude,thereby weakening the relationship between business entertainment expenses and tax evasion.Finally,the increase in collusion costs also weakens the incentives of both parties,which explains why the central Party leadership's eight-point decision on improving Party and government conduct since December 2012 weakened the relationship between business entertainment expenses and corporate tax evasion.This anti-corruption campaign increased the cost of collusion.This research has important policy implications for strengthening tax administration and improving the country s fiscal capacity.Collusion is the result of the lack of institutional supply.Therefore,strengthening the construction of the tax collection system,especially reducing the discretion of the tax administrator,is critical for reducing tax evasion.In addition,strengthen the macro anti-corruption efforts and the establishment of a third-party income reporting system can increase the cost of collusion.