管理层权力是否加剧了上市公司高管薪酬粘性?

Does Managerial Power Increase the Stickiness of Executive Compensation in Listed Companies?

近年来,高管薪酬在中国上市公司中的快速增长以及异常工资等现象的出现引起了社会的广泛关注。由此本文选取中国沪深两市A股上市公司2012—2016年数据作为研究样本,验证高管薪酬粘性的存在以及管理层权力对高管薪酬粘性的作用,并在此基础上引入股权性质来对比考察管理层权力对高管薪酬粘性的影响程度。结果显示,管理层权力与高管的薪酬粘性呈现出显著的正向相关关系,且国有企业中管理层权力对高管薪酬粘性的影响程度较非国有企业更显著。结合中国特殊制度背景,笔者认为在治理中国上市公司高管薪酬粘性的方法中,约束管理层来控制其手中职权是降低高管薪酬粘性的有效途径。

In recent years,the rapid growth of executive compensation in Chinese listed companies and the emergence of abnormal wages have caused widespread concern in the society.Therefore,this paper chooses the data of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2012 to 2016 as the research sample to verify the stickiness of top management compensation and the role of Managerial Power in the executive pay stickiness.Based on this,this paper introduces the nature of equity to compare the impact of Managerial Power on the stickiness of executive compensation.The results show that there is a significant positive correlation between managerial power and the stickiness of top management compensation,and the impact of Managerial Power on SOE stickiness in state-owned enterprises is more significant than non-state-owned enterprises.Combined with the background of our country's special system,the author believes that in the management of China's listed companies executives pay sticky approach,restraining management to control their power is an effective way to reduce the sticky pay of executives.