财政改革与义务教育支出结构偏向

Fiscal Decentralization and Expenditure Structure Deviation of Compulsory Education

基于2000~2014年省级面板数据,本文运用双向固定效应模型实证分析了现行财政分权体制下,两次集权性义务教育财政体制改革对中国义务教育经费支出结构偏向的影响机理。研究表明:"财政分权效应"不利于地方政府增加非刚性的预算内公用经费支出;"集权改革效应"则分情况而论:以县为主体制改革产生了挤出效应,地方政府更"重预算内人员经费支出,轻预算内公用经费支出";而省级统筹新机制改革产生了激励效应,即对地方政预算内公用经费支出具有显著的正效应,而对预算内人员经费支出则不具有显著性。为改善义务教育经费支出结构偏向,一方面应适度集权,提高省级政府的义务教育经费统筹分配权;另一方面应建立更为明确的激励考核机制和监督管理机制。

Based on provincial-level panel data from 2000 to 2014 and the two-way fixed effects model,this paper analyzes the influence mechanism of the two centralized system reforms on the expenditure structure deviation of compulsory education in China under the current fiscal decentralization system.The results show that fiscal decentralization effect is not conducive to local governments increasing non-rigid budgetary public expenditure;centralized reform effect is divided by circumstances.County-based system reform has produced a crowding-out effect that makes local governments give more priority on budgetary personnel expenditure than budgetary public expenditure.The new mechanism has produced an incentive effect which has a significant positive effect on budgetary public expenditure of local governments and doesn’t have significant effect on budgetary personnel expenditure.In order to improve the expenditure structural deviation of compulsory education,it is necessary to centralize moderately and increase the provincial governments’overall fund allocation of compulsory education.On the other hand,more explicit incentive assessment and supervision mechanism should be established.