理性的先天与形式价值论:论析胡塞尔的价值论构想

The Rational a priori and Formal Axiology: On Husserl's Axiological Conception

胡塞尔将评价意识看成情感活动的组成部分,但却从理性上为其价值论奠基。这种奠基依赖于形式逻辑学与形式价值论的类比:情感领域具有与形式逻辑学领域类似的结构、形式和形式法则等。而之所以能够进行类比则基于理性一致性的法则。本文从理性的行为动机及其相关项两个层面阐释了这种类比的关联过程,说明了某些价值论法则的独特性,并对理性与情感行为在其中的作用做了较细致的分析。胡塞尔的形式价值论的思路内在地回应了当代有关价值客观性的争论。当然,它完全不是将价值性和颜色性加以简单并置的直接类比,而是强烈地表达了一种将价值谓词确立在逻辑谓词之上的理性先天论。但未能确切地说明情感在这个思路中的作用,恰恰是其价值论构想的困难所在。

Husserl considers emotional valuing acts as parts of our emotional life,but his axiological conception is characteristic of a rationally axiological foundation depend on an analogy between formal logic and formal axiology.For Husserl,our emotional life is endowed with a similarity of structure,form and formal laws to that of formal logic,and it is on the base of the law of consistency that the formal logic could be analogous to the formal axiology.This paper aims to analyze,from the perspectives of the motives of rational acts and their respective correlates,the interconnections between them,through which we purposely to articulate some particularity of axiological laws and to reveal the functions that reasoning and feeling really take within.We conclude that Husserl s formal axiology possesses an inner response to the contemporary debate about the objectivity of values,but his method is not to make directly a comparison between valueness and colorness,but to ask for a rational apriorisim that found axiological predicates on logical ones.However,the role of emotions in Husserl s routine of formal axiology was not appropriately accounted for,which is what his conception of values really confronts with.