期刊文献+

基于博弈论的强行变道处罚及举报奖励对交叉口交通状况的改善

Improvement of Traffic Condition of Intersection out of the Penalty for Forced Lane Change and the Reward Based on the Game Theory
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摘要 为减少车辆强行变道造成的交通流延误和拥堵,从交叉口范围内车辆个体角度入手,运用博弈论对强行变道过程相关车辆进行博弈分析,求出纳什均衡点,并引入强行变道经济处罚与举报奖励,对加入强行变道处罚与同时加入强行变道处罚和举报奖励两种情况下的强行变道经济处罚措施对交叉口交通的改善进行效果分析。研究发现:两种情况下的强行变道经济处罚及举报奖励可以使车辆采取强行变道时的交通收益在一定程度上降低,进而有效抑制强行变道行为的发生。 In order to reduce the traffic delay and congestion caused by the forced lane change of vehicle,from the angle of individual vehicle in the intersection,the game theory is used to analyze the related vehicle during the forced lane change to find the Nash equilibrium point and to introduce the economic punishment and the reward for the forced lane change.At the same time,the effect analysis of traffic improvement of the intersection is carried out in the two cases of the penalty and the reward when the measure of the economic punishment is made for the forced lane change.It is found that the two cases of the punishment and the reward can to some extent reduce the traffic income when the vehicle takes a forced lane change and then effectively inhibit the occurrence of the forced lane change.
作者 王晶 WANG Jing(Jinan Branch,Beijing Urban Construction Design Development Group Co.,Ltd.,Jinan 250101,China)
出处 《山东交通学院学报》 CAS 2018年第2期32-36,共5页 Journal of Shandong Jiaotong University
关键词 交叉口 交通状况 强行变道 博弈论 经济处罚 intersection traffic condition forced lane change game theory economic punishment.
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