高管薪酬、在职消费与公司经营绩效的关系研究

On the Relationship of Executive Compensation,Company-paid Consumption and Performance of Central Enterprises

以我国2014—2016年232家中央企业的财务数据为样本,构建了中央企业高管薪酬、在职消费与公司经营绩效的计量模型。并通过实证分析得出以下结论:高管薪酬激励能够在一定程度上抑制在职消费,改善中央企业在职消费水平的不合理状况以及降低代理成本,且能够减轻在职消费给公司经营绩效带来的负面影响。提出提高我国中央企业经营绩效的具体对策和建议,以期使我国中央企业的经营绩效不断提高。

Financial data of 232 central enterprises from 2014 to 2015 were used as an example to construct the measurement model ofexecutive compensation,company-paid consumption and the company's performancein central enterprises.Meanwhile,it was concluded from the empirical analysis that executive compensation in central enterprises,to a certain extent,can restrain company-paid consumption,improve the unreasonable company-paid consumption status and reduce the agency costs,and also decrease the negative impact of company-paid consumption on the company's performance.Finally,some countermeasures to improve the business performance of central enterprises are put forward in order to make their business performance continuously increases.