作为制度性事实的软法:一种社会本体论探究

Soft Law as Institutional Fact: a Study of Social Ontology

"软法是什么"本身可被分解为身份问题与含义问题。前者在问软法如何成其所是,涉及"软"维度和"法"维度;后者则在问某事物是软法,它的必然含义是什么。确立软法身份的关键,在于从诸社会理论或者法理论所提供的各种法身份中抓取那些能够逻辑地剥离国家要素的法概念。作为一种社会本体论,塞尔的制度性事实理论主张人类社会由人类心灵的集体意向性透过常设的宣告式言语行为即"X在C中算作Y"的构成性规则而创立。制度性事实不仅能在结构上容纳法维度和软维度,而且它还提供了诸如软法在集体承认范围内有效、软法既有内在面向也有外在面向以及属于"非语言性"的制度性事实等含义。

The question of“What is soft law”is concerned with two aspects:its identity and its implication.The former is asking what it is to be a soft law,which is related to its“soft”and“law”dimensions;the latter involves what is the necessary implication when something is referred to as a soft law.The key to establishing the soft law’s identity is to see if it contains the legal concepts of the various legal identities provided by all social and legal theories and to see if the concepts can logically be stripped off the state elements.As a type of social ontology,John Searle’s institutional fact theory claims that the whole human society is established by human souls’collective intention through the standing declarative speech act or the so-called constitutive rule“X counted as Y in C”.Institutional fact not only structurally includes both the soft and law dimensions but also provides implications such as soft law’s effectiveness in collective recognition,soft law’s internal&external aspects,and soft law as part of nonlinguistic institutional fact.