摘要
本文以约翰逊政府为中心考察冷战僵持年代的美国对华决策机制。本文认为,约翰逊政府的美国对华决策机制存在信息处理资源相对不足、中国问题专家地位偏低、决策层级脱节等特点,使得辅助决策层和基层职业外交官、政策分析家所提之建议不能及时准确地到达核心决策层。在能与总统直接对话的高级中国问题专家缺位的情况下,辅助决策层中国问题专家的政策建议容易受到地位更高的苏联问题专家的左右与压制,这在一定程度上制约了美国对华政策的根本变革。
This article scrutinizes the decision-making mechanism of America's China policy during the era of Sino-U.S.confrontation.It focuses on the examination of human resources,institutional arrangements,and channels of information processing in relation to China in the Lyndon Johnson administration.It argues that the Johnson administration did not possess enough resources to collect and process information relevant to the complicated issues of China.Due to the lack of a sufficient number of qualitied China experts and the relative low position of these people in the bureaucracy of the executive branch of the American government,there was an obvious disconnect between the working level and the decision-makers'level.As a result,the President was more inclined to be swayed by more influential Soviet specialists than China experts.The paper concludes that to a certain extent,the China policy-making mechanism led to the rigid polices adopted by the American government during the confrontational period.
出处
《美国研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第4期97-120,共24页
The Chinese Journal of American Studies
基金
2018年北京大学人文学科文库中国史丛书子课题的前期研究成果