集体行动困境、高管持股差距与企业创新投入

Dilemma of Collective Action,Managerial Ownership Gap and Enterprise Innovation Investment

对企业高管进行有效的创新激励,是促进企业扩大创新投入及提升未来竞争力的重要机制。现有关于股权激励或高管持股与企业创新关系的研究结果并不一致,高管持股差距是否是其中的原因,以及高管持股差距能否促进企业创新,有待探究。本文以集体行动理论为基础,以中国A股上市公司为研究样本,研究发现,CEO与其他高管的持股差距能作为解决高管团队集体行动困境的选择性激励机制,有助于企业创新;当高管团队规模越大时,这种选择性激励机制对企业创新的促进作用越大,但当CEO临近退休时,这种选择性激励机制对企业创新的促进作用会下降。进一步研究表明,在诸多持股差距模式中,普遍提升高管团队的持股比例并且使CEO与其他高管之间形成较大持股差距,是最有效创新激励安排;与高管持股相比,高管持股差距的创新激励效果更好。

Effective innovation incentive for enterprise managers is an important mechanism to promote investment in innovation,and enhance competitiveness in the future.However,the relationship between managerial ownership and enterprise innovation is uncertain in the exiting literatures.This paper argues that shareholders can not simply determine how much stocks are given to managers,but should pay more attention to the rationality of the internal equity arrangement in top management team.As a matter of fact,managers with different positions and characteristics are given different share proportion.That is to say,there is a difference in share proportion between top management members.Ignoring this key fact,shareholders cannot design effective incentive mechanism for managers during enterprises innovation implement period.From the perspective of collective action theory,the paper considers that there is some collective action dilemma in top management team during enterprise innovation implementation.Concretely,innovation can give top management team benefits;this is the common interests of top management team.But as economic man,CEO and other corporate managers all want to share the income from innovation and let someone else take the cost of innovation,which will lead to the collective action dilemma in top management team.The paper proposes that the ownership gap between CEO and other managers is a selective incentive which can overcome the dilemma of managers action in corporate innovation activities.Using the data of listed enterprises from 2009 to 2016,the paper finds that the larger ownership gap between CEO and other managers is,the more innovation investment will be.As selective incentive mechanism,managerial ownership gap works better when the size of top management team is larger,but when CEO is nearing retirement,the selective incentive mechanism cannot promote enterprise innovation.Further studies in the paper show that,in several managerial ownership gap models,heightening managerial ownership generally as well as forming larger gap is the best model for prompting enterprise innovation.Moreover,for prompting innovation,managerial ownership gap is much better than managerial ownership.The paper has important enlightening for the design of effective managerial incentive mechanism in innovation.Concretely,the main contribution of the paper lies in three aspects.First,the paper uses the theory of collective action to analyze the collective action dilemma in top management team that results from innovation activities,which is a new perspective to study the problem of managerial incentive in innovation activities,and has some inspiration for future research in managerial innovation incentive field.Second,how to design effective selective incentive mechanism is the key problem to solve the action dilemma of top management team in innovation activities.From the perspective of managerial ownership gap,the paper constructs a selective incentive mechanism for managers collective action in innovation activities,which is a new attempt to solve the managers collective action dilemma in innovation activities.Third,the paper further enriches literatures about management incentive and enterprise innovation.There are a lot of studies about management compensation,managerial compensation gap,managerial equity incentive and enterprise innovation,the paper is an effective supplement to the literatures in this field.It is necessary to point out that the paper studies the impact of the stock gap between CEO and other senior executives(non-CEO executives)on enterprise innovation,while the stock gap among non-CEO executives is not involved in.How does the difference ownership among non-CEO executives affect enterprise innovation?What theory should be used to explain the difference ownership among non-CEO executives?These problems need to be studied furtherly.In addition,the paper does not study the impact of t stock option gap and restrictive stock gap in top management team on innovation.This is also the deficiency of the paper.The gap and economic consequences of stock option and restrictive stock in the top management team are very valuable research directions in future.