OTT市场在位者的竞争策略选择及其福利效应分析

Competition Strategies and Welfare effect of Incumbent in OTT Industry

本文构建OTT市场中在位者与进入者的动态博弈模型,从是否封杀OTT企业的接入请求和是否提供增值业务两个角度来研究在位者的应对策略及其福利效应。研究发现:均衡状态下在位者的对策取决于其提供增值业务的成本以及消费者对增值业务的价值评价;从福利角度来看,对OTT企业的封杀策略劣于接入策略;从增值业务的激励角度看,未受规制的接入定价将对在位者发展增值业务提供过度激励,而强制性开放接入的规制能够弱化在位者提供增值业务的诱因。此外,本文还运用主要研究结果分析了"微信收费之争"和"广电封杀互联网电视机顶盒"案例。

By constructing a dynamic game between incumbent and OTT entrant,this article analyzes incumbent’s coping strategies and its welfare effects from whether blocking access or offering value-added service.The equilibrium analysis shows the incumbent’s equilibrium strategy not only depends on the cost of offering value-added service,but also the consumers’evaluation on these services.Welfare analysis shows that blocking strategy is strictly dominated by accessing strategy;under charge access,the incumbent’s incentive to offer value-added service is excess social optimal level and regulation on access price will reduce incumbent’s incentive to offer value-added service.Furthermore,this article applies the core results to analyze cases of“Debates on‘Charging on Wechat’”and“SARFT blocks the Internet TV STB”.