“一肩挑”制度如何影响项目进村?

How does the Institutional Arrangements of Multiple-Job Holding Affect “Projects Entering the Villages”?

本文基于两次全国性社区调查,探讨村"两委"干部"一肩挑"制度对项目进村的影响。实证分析的结果显示,"一肩挑"制度对项目进村有显著的负向作用。验证这对关系后,我们进一步研究村庄是否有大姓以及是否设有议事会这两个因素如何调节"一肩挑"制度对村庄项目获得的影响。分析结果表明,大姓作为社会机制和议事会作为正式制度安排都会降低"一肩挑"制度对项目进村的负向作用,且前者的影响是显著的。文章最后的讨论指出,"一肩挑"制度对项目进村之所以有影响,可能是通过"关系机制"和"合法性机制"实现的。

Based on two National Surveys on Community Governance in China,this paper analyzes the influences of Multiple-Job Holding(MJH)of the leaders of Villagers Committees and Party Branches on“Projects Entering the Villages”.The empirical analysis shows that MJH as an institutional arrangement can significantly reduce the possibilities of projects entering the village.Our research further explores that the large clan as a social mechanism and the Village Council as a formal institutional mechanism can weaken MJH s negative influences.We claim that the probable intermediate influential mechanisms between MJH and“Projects Entering the Village”are the“guanxi mechanism”and the“legitimacy mechanism”.