关联博弈、声誉积累与新创企业的破茧成蝶:观察民间金融经济功能的新视角

The Association Game,the Accumulation of Reputation and the Chrysalid Effectiveness of the New Established Enterprise: A New Views of the Function of Informal Finance

作为创新创业重要主体和宏观经济增长重要驱动力的新创中小企业,其融资来源主要依赖于民间金融。然而,有关民间金融的理论研究只承认它的外生性价值。本文针对新创企业动态演化不同阶段的信任异质性、围绕借款人的道德风险问题,构建声誉效应的信贷博弈模型,从初级储蓄者选择不同融资模式的条件及边界转换的动态角度,探索民间金融的内生性价值。研究表明:在种子期和成长期,民间金融借助熟人社会的关联博弈控制道德风险,为新创中小企业提供融资服务;随着借款人固定资产不断增加和市场声誉不断累积,新创企业出现了蝶蛹效应,从而具备了依靠陌生人社会的制度信任而转向间接融资模式的资信条件。根据中国家庭金融调查数据进行的实证分析表明:当家庭工商资产超过112万元时,其融资模式出现了转换。本文边际贡献是,在理论上对民间金融的内生性功能提供新的观察视角;在弥合两部门关系理论分歧的同时为民间金融促进经济增长的宏观现象提供了一个逻辑与事实一致的微观解释。

New established small and middle enterprises,as an important part of innovation and engine of macroeconomic growth,are mainly financed by private finance.However,existing research only consider its exegetic value.This paper explores the endogenous value of private finance from the perspective of conditions for savers to choose and change various financing models,constructs a credit game model of reputation effect depending on trust heterogeneity at different stages in the new enterprises’evolution process and borrowers’moral hazard problem.This paper finds that informal finance controls moral hazard in acquaintance society through the associated game and provides financial services to new small enterprises.As their fixed assets and market reputation increase,the newly established enterprises get the institutional trust that relies on a stranger society and turn to indirect financing.Depend on the data of CHFS,this paper gives an empirical research and finds that:households will change their mode of finance when their fixed assets reach to 1.12 million yuan.The contribution of this paper is the following:it gives a new view of the function of informal finance and bridges the theoretical divergence on the relationship of the informal-formal finance modes,then gives a theoretical coherently explanation on the fact that the informal finance increases macro-economy.