为什么制造商使用没有约束力的建议零售价?——基于买方抗衡势力视角的解释

Why Do Manufacturers Recommend Non-binding Retail Prices?——An Explanation Based on “Countervailing Power”

没有约束力的建议零售价在生活中无处不在,但学术上对制造商使用建议零售价的内在逻辑仍有待探讨。现有关于制造商使用建议零售价研究的一个不足是,未充分考虑零售商相对于制造商的谈判能力和零售商买方抗衡势力的出现对制造商定价决策的影响。通过构造上下游连续垄断模型,在考虑买方抗衡势力的背景下,考察制造商在转售价格维持(RPM)和建议零售价(RRP)两种定价机制下的均衡决策,探究制造商实施建议零售价的内生机制。研究发现:买方抗衡势力能够为制造商使用建议零售价提供一个新的解释,当买方抗衡势力较小或较大时,制造商和零售商会签订建议零售价合约;只有买方势力和卖方势力水平相当时,制造商和零售商才会签订转售价格维持合约。此外,福利分析验证了加尔布雷斯抗衡势力假说,当买方势力和卖方势力相当时,转售价格维持合约解决了双重加价问题,买方抗衡势力将纠正效率扭曲带来的利润空间转移给消费者,使消费者福利和社会总福利增加。

There is insufficient on the existing research of using recommended retail price by manufacturers,that is,the influence of the bargaining power of retailers and the emergence of countervailing power on manufacturers5 decision-making is not fully considered.Non-binding recommended retail prices are ubiquitous,but the economic rationale for using recommended retail price is not very well understood.In the context of considering countervailing power,constructing the classic double-marginalization model to investigate the model equilibrium under the two pricing mechanism,resale price maintenance(RPM)and recommended retail price(RRP),and to explore the endogenous mechanism of using RRP.It is found that countervailing power can provide a new explanation for the use of RRP.RRP can be an equilibrium solution either when buyer countervailing power is very low or very high,and in the intermediate case,an equilibrium RPM endogenously occurs.In addition,the welfare analysis of this paper validates Galbraith conjecture,because RPM contract solves double marginalization when buyer and seller power are balanced.Buyer countervailing power transfers profit space to consumers,which brought by correcting efficiency distortion,resulting in increase of consumer welfare and total social welfare.