绿色施工监管演化博弈与仿真研究

Evolutionary Game and Simulation Research on Green Construction Supervision

针对绿色施工监管问题,构建演化博弈模型与系统动力学仿真模型,从理论分析和实验仿真两个视角研究建筑企业与监管部门间的博弈关系;分析不同监管机制下博弈系统的均衡点稳定性,探究提高绿色施工概率与稳定性的途径。研究结果表明:静态监管机制下,博弈系统不存在演化稳定均衡点,建筑企业绿色施工概率具有不稳定性;动态惩罚机制下,博弈系统的混合策略均衡点为演化稳定均衡点,提高监管部门失职追责、降低监管成本,能够提高该演化稳定均衡点下的绿色施工概率;将静态监管机制下混合策略均衡点对应的监管概率设定为监管概率阈值,能够使建筑企业绿色施工概率向100%演化并保持稳定,实现监管机制的优化。

Aiming at the problem of green construction supervision,the evolutionary game model and system dynamics simulation model are constructed.From the two perspectives of theoretical analysis and experimental simulation,the game relationship between construction enterprises and regulatory authorities is studied.The stability of the equilibrium point of the game system under different regulatory mechanisms is analyzed,and the ways to improve the probability and stability of green construction are explored.The results show that there is no stable equilibrium in the game system under the static supervision mechanism,and the green construction probability of construction enterprises is unstable.Under the dynamic punishment mechanism,the mixed strategy equilibrium point of the game system is the evolutionary stable equilibrium point.It can improve the dereliction of duty and reduce the supervision cost of the supervision department,which can improve the green construction probability under the stable equilibrium point of the evolution.The probability of corresponding equilibrium of the mixed policy equilibrium under static supervision mechanism is set as the probability of monitoring probability,which can make the green construction probability of construction enterprises evolve to 100%and maintain stability,and achieve the optimization of regulatory mechanism.