供应商纵向持股对竞争性制造商定价策略的影响

The Effect of Supplier's Vertical Shareholding on Competitive Manufacturer's Pricing Strategy

研究供应商对制造商进行持股时,不同的市场结构与持股比例对竞争性制造商定价策略的影响。根据制造商市场地位的差异,构建双寡头领导者、被持股制造商为领导者与未被持股制造商为领导者3种持股模型,运用博弈论中的逆向归纳法求解各模型均衡产量,零售价格及最优利润。研究发现:1)被持股制造商的最优零售价格在自身强势时最高,在竞争对手强势时次之,未被持股制造商的产品价格同时受到持股比例与市场结构的影响;2)持股比例较大时,被持股制造商具有"先动优势",持股比例较小时,具有"后动优势",而未被持股制造商的"后动优势"与持股比例无关;3)供应链整体利润随持股比例的增加先升高后降低,社会福利与持股比例呈正相关。

The equity strategic alliance is a partnership formed between companies to achieve common goals.This is a very common phenomenon in supply chain management.In this context,a study is conducted on the influence of different market structures and shareholding ratios on competitive manufacturers'pricing strategies when supplier holds equity in the manufacturer.According to the difference in the market position of manufacturers,three stockholding models were constructed:duopoly leader,held-owner manufacturer as leader and un-held manufacturer as leader,using the backward induction of game theory to solve the equilibrium yield,retail price and optimal profit.The results show,1)that the optimal retail price of manufacturer held by supplier is the highest when it is leader,and second when the competitor is leader.The optimal price of manufacturer not held by supplier is affected by both the shareholding ratio and the market structure;2)that when the proportion of shareholding is large,the manufacturer held by supplier has the"first mover advantage"and the"backward advantage"when the proportion of shareholding is small,and the"backward advantage"of the manufacturer not held by supplier is irrelevant to the shareholding ratio;and 3)that the supply chain profit increases first and then decreases with the shareholding ratio,with social welfare positively correlated with the ratio.