财政分权背景下政府干预对企业债务融资的影响

Fiscal Decentralization,Governmental Intervention and Corporate Debt Financing

基于上市公司的研究样本,考察了财政分权背景下的政企关系与官员的行政晋升激励对企业债务融资的影响。结果显示,财政分权越不充分的地区,地方政府所属国有企业和属地的民营企业更容易获取银行的长期债务融资;GDP和财政收入增速越慢的地区,地方政府所属的国有企业和属地的民营企业更容易获取银行的长期债务融资。进一步研究发现,以财政分权与地方官员行政晋升激励为特征的中国式分权制度下,政企关系及政府对企业的干预不仅存在于地方政府与其所控制的国有公司之间,还包括其属地的民营公司。而且由此引发的政府对企业的干预,在市场化进程不同的东部、中部和西部都广泛存在。研究表明,基于财政分权和GDP相对增长绩效的地方政府官员行政晋升激励机制,是影响我国政企关系与企业债务融资的主要因素。要提高银行信贷资金的使用效率,优化企业的融资结构,切实减少政府对企业与银行的干预,就必须完善我国分权化改革的相关措施,如改革以GDP与财政收入的相对增长绩效为考核标准的地方官员行政晋升激励制度。

On the basis of listed companies’data,this paper investigates government-enterprise relationship and corporate debt financing in the background of fiscal decentralization.We find that the more inadequate the fiscal decentralization of some regions are the more easily,the local government-owned companies and private companies in these regions get long-term loan from bank.The slower GDP growth and fiscal revenue of the region,the more easily they get long-term loan from bank.Further study finds in Chinese decentralization system characteristic of fiscal decentralization and local official’s promotion incentives,the government-enterprise relationship and government influence not only the local government-owned companies but also the private companies in the areas,and in eastern,central and western China.It is concluded that Chinese decentralization system which is characteristic of fiscal decentralization and local official’s promotion incentives is an important factor that influences corporate debt financing.To improve the efficiency of bank credit funds,optimize enterprise’s financing structure,and effectively reduce government influence on enterprises and banks,it is necessary to improve China's decentralization reform measures,such as reforming to Local official’s promotion incentives which mainly depend on local GDP and fiscal revenues.