地方政府在集体经营性建设用地入市中的利益博弈研究

The benefit game of local government in the mercantilization of collective-owned commercial construction land

在明确地方政府在集体经营性建设用地入市中的角色定位与博弈关键点的基础上,运用完全信息动态博弈模型研究了地方政府在入市交易中可能的利益博弈行为。研究结果表明:在现行税收制度和土地征收制度下,要让地方政府真正支持集体经营性建设用地入市改革,需满足以下四条件:提高集体经营性建设用地入市交易缴纳的税费;禁止地方政府以"农村基础设施投入"为由直接参与集体经营性建设用地入市收益分配,明确其只参与收益二次分配;降低地方政府在国有土地交易中土地出让金分配份额;提高地方政府征地成本。此研究可为探索集体经营性建设用地入市,构建城乡统一的建设用地市场提供参考借鉴。

This study uses the complete information dynamic game model to analyze the possible interests of local government in market transactions and thereby clarify local government’s role in collective management of land use in the market and the key points of the game,.The results show that under the current tax system and land expropriation system,if the local government really supports reform of the collective management of land for land use,it will meet four conditions:(1)increase the taxes and fees paid by the collective management of land use transactions;(2)promote"rural infrastructure investment"as a direct participant in the collective management of land for the construction of land revenue distribution(its only participation in the secondary distribution of income);(3)reduce the local government land transfer in the state land distribution share;and(4)increase local government land acquisition cost.This study contributes to the purpose of providing a reference for exploring the transfer of collective construction land into the market and constructing a unified urban and rural construction land market.