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微处理器硬件木马及其检测挑战

Hardware Trojan of Processor and Detection Challenge
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摘要 微处理器是控制系统运行的核心芯片,受到了硬件木马的严重威胁。针对典型微处理器硬件木马进行了分析,根据微处理器的组成结构及其硬件木马的激活方式进行了分类,对现有旁路检测技术进行了系统总结,分析了微处理器硬件木马对旁路检测所提出的挑战,从指令模板分析、电磁与功耗联合分析、差分旁路信号采集等方面进行了应对展望。 Processor is the core chip of system running control,which is severely threatened by hardware Trojan.Several typical hardware Trojans of processor are analyzed.Classification is made according to processor architecture and hardware Trojan activation.Side channel based detection methods and the challenge of processor's hardware Trojan detection are analyzed systematically.Methods are prospected for counteracting hardware Trojan of processor,including instruction template analysis,electromagnetic and power joint analysis,differential side channel signal acquisition.
作者 张阳 全厚德 李雄伟 陈开颜 ZHANG Yang;QUAN Hou-de;LI Xiong-wei;CHEN Kai-yan(Department of Information Engineering,Ordnance Engineering College,Shijiazhuang 050003,China)
出处 《火力与指挥控制》 CSCD 北大核心 2018年第8期129-133,共5页 Fire Control & Command Control
基金 国家青年科学基金(61602505) 国家自然科学基金资助项目(61271152 51377170)
关键词 微处理器 硬件木马 组成结构 旁路分析 指令模板 processor hardware trojan architecture side channel analysis instruction template
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